


Total Army Analysis (TAA)



PRIMER 2009

Use this primer in conjunction with AR 71-11 (Total Army Analysis), the Army War College text "How the Army Runs", Chapter 5 and FM 100-11 Force Integration.

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I. Force Development Process (overview)

1. The focus of this primer is the Total Army Analysis process. In order to understand the TAA process, it is imperative that a person understand where TAA fits into the larger process which is called Force Development.
2. Use this primer to supplement information provided in the Army War College text “*How the Army Runs*”, FM 100-11 *Force Integration*, and Army Regulation 71-11 *Total Army Analysis*.
3. Force development is the start point, rationale and underlying basis for defining the Army’s force structure. The Force Development Process consists of defining required military capabilities, designing force structures to provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on the threat, doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. The five phases are:
 - a. Develop Capabilities
 - b. Design Organizations
 - c. Develop Organizational Models
 - d. Determine Organizational Authorizations
 - e. Document Organizational Authorizations




Figure 1. Force Development Process

4. The five phases of the force development process are displayed at **figure 1** (previous page). This model reflects a sequence of events and how these functions relate to each other. The resulting products of force development provide the basis for acquiring and distributing materiel and acquiring, training, and distributing personnel in the Army. It is useful to use the Army Force Development Process to visualize how each step relates to the other steps and contributes to the accomplishment of each task.

a. Phase I: **Develop capabilities.**

- 1) The force development process has its roots in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). A separate primer (Capabilities Development and Systems Acquisition Management), discussing the JCIDS process, can be found on the Army Force Management School web site: www.afms1.army.mil. JCIDS identifies the desired operational capability in terms of personnel, equipment, and unit structure. This process begins with the receipt of strategic / national-level guidance [National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), Joint Programming Guidance (JPG)], and guidance from the Army's senior leadership (The Army Plan (TAP)), joint warfighting concepts (such as rapid decisive operations and peace enforcement operations), and/or new materiel capabilities evolving from research, development, and acquisition (RDA) processes.
- 2) **The focus** of JCIDS is to **resolve** identified capabilities gaps, perceived deficiencies and / or shortcomings in the joint force. **The objective** of JCIDS is to develop solutions that are affordable, militarily useful, and supportable to the combatant commanders. JCIDS develops integrated, joint capable solutions within the domains of **DOTMLPF (doctrine, organizational structure, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities)**. The process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost.
- 3) The analysis process is composed of a structured, three-phased capabilities-based assessment (CBA) methodology that identifies tasks, determines capability gaps and redundancies, and proposed DOTMLPF approaches to resolve or mitigate validated capability gaps. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) assesses the future warfighting concepts through a series of analyses, tests, experiments and studies to gain insights across DOTMLPF. Using the integrated capabilities development teams (ICDT) management technique, TRADOC pursues timely involvement of appropriate agencies/expertise to aggressively identify and work issues. TRADOC establishes force operating capabilities (FOCs) as the foundation upon which to base the assessment process. These critical, force-level, measurable statements of operational capability frame how the Army will realize advanced full spectrum operations as stated in the approved capstone concept. The FOCs focus the Army's Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP) and warfighting experimentation. As the transformation process unfolds, these force-level objective concepts give rise to supporting proponent/branch future FOCs included within subordinate concepts. This assessment process leads to a recommendation by the Commanding General (CG), TRADOC to Headquarters, Department of the Army

(HQDA), on how to best fulfill the warfighting requirement. See **figure 2** for resolution of “capability gaps”. If the capability requires a change in doctrine, training, or leader development, TRADOC initiates actions to meet the requirement upon validation by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 and approval by the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA). If the solution set results in a need for change in soldier occupational specialty structure, the recommendation goes forward to HQDA DCS, G-1 for action. If the required capability needs a materiel solution, TRADOC prepares the initial capabilities document (ICD) and a capability development document (CDD). TRADOC forwards the ICD and CDD to HQDA DCS, G-3/5/7 for approval of the requirement through the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation/approval process. HQDA DCS, G-8 is responsible for materiel solutions and DOTMLPF integration throughout the program life cycle. Warfighting concepts requiring organizational solutions move to the next phase of force development.




Figure 2. What Solves the Capability Gap?

b. Phase II: **Design organizations.**

- 1) The **DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS PHASE** provides the “**organizational**” solution to DOTMLPF. This Phase analyzes the proposed organization or change to an

organization for **doctrinal correctness**. This phase provides a forum for the entire Army to review the issue while linking the **Capability, Materiel, Training and Document Developers** together. Organizational requirements flowing from the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA), determine whether a **new** or **modified** organization is required on tomorrow's battlefield to satisfy the capability gap identified in the **DEVELOP CAPABILITIES PHASE**. Organizational **requirements** are documented through a series of connected and related organizational development processes: Unit Reference Sheet (**URS**) development; Force Design Update (**FDU**) process; Table of Organization and Equipment (**TOE**) development; and Basis-Of-Issue Plan (BOIP) development.

- 2) When a DOTMLPF analysis is performed, and a new or improved organization is selected as the best solution, the capability development communities in TRADOC or the other proponents document proposed organizations or modifications to existing organizations on a unit reference sheet (**URS**). The URS specifies the organization's mission and functions as well as outlining required personnel and equipment. TRADOC's Force Design Directorate (FDD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, receives the URS from the proponents. FDD tracks the action through the staffing and approval process called the force design update (**FDU**) process. Within the FDU process, good ideas are taken from a variety of sources, and developed through an Army-wide consensus, staffed and forwarded through HQ, TRADOC to HQDA. The CSA or VCSA approves the design and simultaneously provides their Army-wide implementation instructions. The URS contains sufficient details (unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility requirements, and concept of operations), to support Army force design initiatives and related studies and analyses. Once approved, the URS is further refined, in the next phase, into an organizational model known as a table of organization and equipment (**TOE**).

c. Phase III: **Develop organizational models.**

- 1) The U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) applies rules, standards, and guidance to the doctrinally correct design producing the organizational model (TOE). Other organizations such as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and Medical Command (MEDCOM) develop organizational designs as well.
- 2) The TOE is a **requirements document**. The TOE is the definition of a fully mission-capable organization. It prescribes an organization's doctrinal wartime mission, its organizational structure, and detailed personnel and equipment requirements.
- 3) When DOTMLPF analysis mandates a materiel solution, the proponents form an integrated capabilities development team (ICDT), and the materiel developer forwards data on the new equipment to USAFMSA for basis of issue plan feeder data (BOIPFD) submission. USAFMSA develops the data into a Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). Also, the BOIP is a requirements document, which is applied to appropriate TOEs and MTOEs to add or modify equipment and/or personnel requirements.

- d. Phase IV: **Determine organizational authorizations.** The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process is used by HQDA to determine organizational authorizations (Phase IV). TAA is discussed in detail in Sections III through VIII of this primer. TAA determines the proper mix of organizations required and resourced that comprise a balanced and affordable force to meet the guidance issued by the President, Congress, OSD or Army leadership. TAA develops the total requirements for peacetime, wartime, rotational force and DOD tasks, and subsequently the authorizations defining the force structure the Army must *build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource* to meet OSD / Army guidance, combatant commanders' requirements and force structure initiatives. The HQDA approved TOEs, approved during the previous phase, compete for authorizations – the “*coin of the realm*” in the force structure business – broken out in Officer / Warrant Officer / Enlisted spaces. TAA first determines the **total requirements** (the number of units, by type – 100% manned and equipped). The TAA process continues by determining the force **resourced** based on priorities, budgetary constraints and guidance. The resulting force structure is the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force, the force that is recommended for resourcing to OSD in the Army's POM submission. TAA takes into account force guidance and resource availability to produce a balanced and affordable force structure. It determines and/or verifies the affordability, supportability, and executability of the organizational model.

TAA is the process that takes us from the Army of today to the Army of the future. It requires a **doctrinal basis** and **analysis**; is based upon **strategic guidance** from above the Army; and involves **threat analysis, specific scenarios, and an Army “constrained” force.**

TAA process has the potential of changing every facet of the Army.

- e. Phase V: **Document organizational authorizations.** After approval of the resourced force structure by the Army leadership, USAFMSA manages the process of documenting the decision(s). This process results in organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA).

II. TAA – Phase IV of the Force Development Process

The focus of Phase IV of the Force Development Process is the TAA process. This phase, determining organizational authorizations, provides the proper mix of organizations that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure for the Army. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE) and the Joint Staff Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). It develops force structure in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming and budgeting. The development of a force is based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, threats, and the dynamics of externally and internally imposed constraints (i.e., dollars, end strength, roles, and missions).

The mix of unit models that make up a balanced and affordable force structure must support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

III. Total Army Analysis (TAA) Overview

1. TAA is the resource sensitive process that executes the decisions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Department of Defense (DOD) PPBE, directives and initiatives of the Joint Staff, and the Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. The Army's strategic roles must support the National Military Strategy (NMS). These roles have a major impact on the shaping of the Army. Therefore, TAA is instrumental in developing force that meets the NMS guidelines and defeats the threat within the defined scenarios and under the established dollar constraints; and fulfills all the roles and missions listed, within the parameters of congressional oversight and guidance.
2. TAA serves as the bridge between OSD/Joint Staff guidance and the Army's planning and program building processes, balancing the Army's force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources. Decisions, as a result of the TAA process, will shape the future size and composition of the Army and are senior leadership sensitive and made in the best interest of the Army.
3. Additionally, the TAA process is the means to transition from the planning phase to the programming phase within the Army's PPBE process, assisting in determining, verifying and justifying Army requirements, while assessing force capabilities. The TAA process is flexible and responsive to dynamic changes. The process involves external inputs from the President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Joint Staff, OSD, and Combatant Commanders' priorities (for example: anticipated threats, scenarios, end-strengths, and assumptions). The process flows from internal Army actions, decisions and guidance from the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, Combatant Commanders (for example: allocations rules, resource assumptions, warfighting capabilities, and infrastructure priorities); and the commands (Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands and Direct Reporting Units), in the decision-making process for both requirements and resources decisions. The end result of the TAA process is the right mix of unit models (MTOEs) that make up a balanced and affordable force structure to support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
4. TAA is a multi-phased force structuring process. It consists of both qualitative and quantitative analyses designed to develop the "operating and generating forces", MTOE and TDA, necessary to sustain and support the combat forces delineated in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), scenarios, and The Army Plan (TAP). The purpose of TAA is to define the required support forces to make the combat forces successful.
5. TAA is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for explaining and defending Army force structure. The TAA process takes us from the Army of today to the Army of the future. It

requires a doctrinal basis and analysis, flowing from strategic guidance and joint force requirements. By regulation, TAA is a biennial process initiated during even-numbered years. HQDA, G-3/5/7, initiates the formal TAA process upon receipt of OSD/Joint Staff guidance (GDF/JPG), scenarios, and draft TAP. Based on these documents and guidance, the routine TAA cycle occurs.

6. TAA is an evolving process. The DOD and Army transformation efforts required more agile, responsive, concise processes to provide the Army leadership more timely and flexible force structure options. The ARSTAF continues refining the TAA process, shortening the process time, and initiation of selected analyses (i.e., Modular Support Force Analysis, Force Management Review, and Institutional Army Requirements Review). Lean Six Sigma was applied to the TAA process during the conduct of the Force Management Review (FMR) 09-13 and TAA 10-15 iterations. Based on guidance from Army leadership, the process was modified to take only ten (10) months instead of the Army regulatory requirement of two years; develops and analyzes force structure options versus a single force structure recommendation; incorporated video tele-conferencing (VTC) as a communication means into the process; and used the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) as a collective review forum to assist in very senior leader decision-making.

Major Changes to the TAA Process – by TAA iteration (figure 3). More detailed information is available at appendix A.

TAA-03 calculated only the MTOE “warfighting” requirements.
TAA-05 incorporated the Base Generating Force Requirements.
TAA-07 calculated all Army requirements (MTOE / ITOE & TDA, all COMPOs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) as a doctrinal, organizational and materiel solution to eliminate existing capability gaps.
TAA-09 incorporated Homeland Security as the first priority of the “Simultaneity Stack”, based on the force sizing construct known as “1-4-2-1”.
TAA-11 initiated MODULARITY as the basic Army structure.
MSFA 07-11 captured FDU and leadership decisions not incorporated in TAA-11.
TAA 08-13 incorporated MODULARITY and used the SPG / JPG as OSD guidance. TAA 08-13 was informed by QDR 2006 for force structure guidance and force sizing construct.
FMR 09-13 captured modular design FDU and leadership decisions post TAA 08-13, while addressing some of the QDR 2006 decisions.
FMR 09-13 Grow the Army (GTA) addressed the President's decisions to: surge operational units into Iraq; expedite-accelerate conversions of BCTs, increase total strength in all Components, increase 5 AC BCTs, re-balance the AC/RC, and execute BRAC.
TAA 10-15 informed QDR 2009, modeled the Total Force Requirements over the next 7 years, fixed the imbalance in force structure and grew some new capability.
TAA 12-17 began in April '09 and initially addressed FY12-15 “over structure”. TAA continues to review and adapt the TAA process to best support Army requirements. TAA 12-17 will serve as the baseline force for POM 12-17.

Figure 3. Major Changes to the TAA Process

7. TAA General:

- a. TAA is the basis for the Army's POM development and establishment of the POM Force. The Army develops the POM force to achieve an affordable and competent force capable of best supporting national objectives and Combatant Commanders' warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and the Services at the transition between planning and programming.
- b. TAA determines the total requirements to meet the NMS, GDF/JPG, TAP and other guidance. TAA resources the total requirements based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, and input from the combatant commanders. The resulting force structure is the POM force, forwarded to OSD with recommendations for approval. When Congress approves the budget, all approved units are programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), in phase V of the Force Development Process (**figure 1 on page 2**).

- c. The purpose of TAA is to determine the required "operating and generating" forces necessary to meet all of the tasks assigned to the Army.

KNOWN: The OSD guidance includes the "DIRECTED FORCE" currently set at 76 BCTs.

UNKNOWN: What Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Generating Force is required to make the "operating force" successful during combat and daily mission requirements? TAA develops the supporting and sustaining force structure required by the "operating force" to be successful.

UNKNOWN: What echelon above brigade (EAB) support force and generating force structure is necessary to meet the needs of the BCTs during Homeland Defense, Army Support to other Services, Posture of Engagement rotations and the Major Combat Operations (MCOs)?

- d. The specified combat forces and the EAB support forces determined during the TAA process are referred to as "operating forces". The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force, the force recommended and supported by resource requests in the Army POM, as part of the future years defense program (FYDP), are developed during the TAA process. TAA determines the force for each program year. It has Army wide participation, culminating in Senior Leaders of the Department (**SLDA**) of the Army for decision and approval.
- e. The TAA **principal products** are the (**figure 4**):
 - Army's total warfighting requirements;
 - Required support forces (EAB) for all mission tasks;
 - Force resourced against requirements and budgetary constraints;
 - Army structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum; and
 - Initial POM force.

Products of the TAA Process:



Army total warfighting requirements:

- **Combat Forces are directed (MTOE/ITOE)**
- **Determine the Army's total support force requirements (MTOE/ITOE)**

Combat Support

- Chemical
- Engineer
- Signal
- Military Police
- Military Intel
- Space

Combat Service Support

- Medical
- Ordnance
- Quartermaster
- Supply
- Public Affairs
- Personnel Services
- Military History
- Judge Advocate
- Maintenance
- Transportation

- **Captures the Army's Generating Force total requirements (TDA)**



TAA resources the Force (MTOE & TDA / All COMPOs)



Decisions captured in the Army structure memorandum (ARSTRUC)



Provides the Force Structure foundation for the next POM

TAA 08-13	■ ■ ■ ■ ■	➡	POM 08-13
FMR 09-13	■ ■ ■ ■ ■	➡	POM 09-13 update
FMR 09-13+	■ ■ ■ ■ ■	➡	POM 10-15 / QDR 09
TAA 10-15	■ ■ ■ ■ ■	➡	POM 11-15 update (PBR 11-15)
TAA 12-17	■ ■ ■ ■ ■	➡	POM 12-17 / QDR 09



Provides the force pool for Sustained and Future Operations

ARSTRUC: Army Structure Message
 COMPO: Component
 FMR: Force Management Review
 ITOE: Intermediate Table of Organization & Equipment
 MSFA: Modular Support Force Analysis

MTOE: Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
 PBR: Program Budget Review
 POM: Program Objective Memorandum
 TAA: Total Army Analysis
 TDA: Table of Distribution & Allowance

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Figure 4. Products of the TAA Process

- e. TAA **objectives** are to:
- Develop, analyze, determine and justify a POM force, aligned with the QDR, GDF/JPG and TAP. The POM force is that force projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
 - Provide analytical underpinnings for the POM force for use in dialogue among Congress, OSD, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and the Army.
 - Assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production base, and equipment distribution programs on the projected force structure.
 - Assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBE process.
 - Provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations.

IV. The TAA process Specifics:

1. TAA is a two-phased analytical and subjective process consisting of **Requirements Generation** (force guidance and quantitative analysis), and **Resource Determination** (qualitative analysis and leadership review).
 - TAA determines the correct mix of organizations **required** and **resourced** that comprise a balanced and affordable force to meet the guidance.
 - Remember – Until modularity is completely implemented, the Army will continue to have combat force structure based on Army of Excellence (AOE), Power Projection, and Force XXI designs. Therefore, the support forces will be varied and changing over time as “transformation” continues. The QDR 06 established the directed force (combat) as 76 BCTs, which make up one portion of the “Operating Force”.
 - TAA, through CAA modeling, determines the remainder of the “operating force”. The combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) comprise the other portion of the “operating force”. During the transition to modularity, the support forces transition from echelons above division (EAD) and echelons above corps (EAC) to echelons above brigade (EAB). **Figure 5** reflects the current breakout.
 - Finally, CAA determines the “generating forces” necessary to support and sustain the operating forces.



Figure 5 Operating and Generating Forces

2. **Figure 6** depicts the sequence of activities for the TAA process.




Figure 6. TAA Process

TAA Highlights:

A two phased force development process.

Primarily a force structuring process (all Components / MTOE/ITOE & TDA).

Specifies force structure requirements for each year of the POM.

Incorporates resource / program constraints.

A computer-assisted process.

Has Army-wide participation including Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army review, CSA decision and SECARMY approval.

- Phase I** of the TAA process, captures the Army's combat requirements (MTOE), generates the Army's support requirements (MTOE), and develops the Army's generating force requirements (TDA).

- 1) TAA develops the echelons above brigade in the modular design support forces of the “operating forces” [i.e., combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS)], and TDA force structure.
 - 2) TDA support is referred to as the “generating forces”, required to support both portions of the “operating force” structure. The generating force (GF) is predominately comprised of TDA organizations. The GF satisfies the CONUS/OCONUS force structure requirements for the operating force.
 - 3) In the past, there has been a clear delineation of Operating Force (MTOE) and Generating Force (TDA). As the TAA process has matured, it is clear that some GF perform duties and functions in the operational area as EAB CS/CSS and functions within the sustaining base. The organizations performing theater operations and GF / Title 10 Responsibilities are termed: **Blended Organizations**. When the Institutional Army TAA is complete, an updated definition is expected.
- b. **Phase II** of the TAA process, resources the requirements (MTOE & TDA; all components) based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, and input from the combatant commanders (day-to-day requirements). The resulting force structure is the POM force, forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with a recommendation for approval. When congress approves the budget, all approved units are programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS).

V. TAA Specifics:

1. **Phase I. Requirements Generation.** Requirements determination, the more critical of the two phases, is made up of two separate events: force guidance and quantitative analysis. Accurate planning, consumption and workload factors, threat data, and allocation rules ensure accurate computer developed requirements.
 - a. **Force guidance.** Force guidance consists of data inputs and guidance from various sources. Guidance from the President, Congress, OSD, JCS, the ARSEC, and ARSTAF are included. Threat data, other Service data, coalition force data, and weapons effectiveness are included. Finally, previous leadership decisions and current guidance from the Secretary of the Army (SA), CSA, VCSA, DCS, G-3/5/7 and DCS, G-8 are addressed. The guidance addresses objectives, threat data, and resource assumptions and priorities.
 - a. **External Army Guidance.** The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process, not all of which is exclusively within the realm of the Army. The National Military Strategy (NMS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Guidance for Development of the Force (GFD) / Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), constitute the major JCS/DOD directives and constraints imposed upon Army force structure.
 - 1) The NMS describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. Also, the

NMS also addresses the force structure requirements for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Special Operations Command and Reserve Components.

- 2) National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS serves as the Department of Defense's capstone document in the long-term effort. It flows from the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy. It also provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. It reflects the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review and lessons learned from on-going operations. It addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces will fight and win America's wars and how we seek to work with and through partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert conflict. The NDS describes our overarching goals and strategy. It outlines how DoD will support the objectives outlined in the NSS.
- 3) QDR:
 - (a) Congress mandates that the QDR is conducted every four years.
 - (b) The QDR report addresses the total force required to implement the President's national security strategy and the supporting NMS at prudent military risk.
 - (c) QDR 2001 provided a "capabilities based" strategy and a new force planning construct.
 - (d) QDR 2006 adjusted the capabilities based strategy, the force sizing construct and the number of combat brigades within the Army (set at 70 brigades).
 - (e) QDR 2006 has generated changes in the SPG/JPG documents. Continued analysis of the QDR should generate additional changes in the JPG. Additionally, the QDR should have an influence on and generate a change to the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy (NDS) and The Army Plan (TAP).
 - (f) QDR 2009 will provide the strategic guidance for the current administration. The ARSTAF has begun preparations with the SECDEF, DOD, JCS and ARSEC.
- 4) GDF / JPG.
 - (a) The Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) provides unified, resource-informed strategic objectives, key assumptions, priorities, fiscal projections, and acceptable risks. The GDF focuses on "**what**" needs to be done, **not** the "**how**".
 - (b) The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) provides fiscally constrained programming guidance, directing the services to program towards the strategic objectives. The JPG focuses on the "**how**" and the "**how well to do it**".
 - (c) Based on the GDF/JPG, the Services prepare their POM. For the Army, the GDF/JPG provides the strategy, and capabilities needed, across the range of military operations.

5) Scenarios or vignettes:

- (a) Previous modeling vignettes were called major combat operations (MCO).
- (b) Current OSD scenarios are provided within a format called the “**Analytic Agenda**”. Scenarios are developed at OSD for joint/combined warfighting at the theater level. OSD has executed several **Operational Availability (OA)** Studies to determine mid-term (end of program) warfighting scenarios. Each OA study leverages previous efforts (tools, data, and personnel) against the large pool of capabilities. OA Studies have focuses on “Multiple Theaters and Swiftly Defeat concepts”; “Single theaters and assessing overlapping regime changes, and post-hostilities operations”; and incorporates QDR 2006 guidance and the President’s total strength increase.
- (c) Defense Planning Scenario-**Multi Service Force Deployment (MSFD)** is the current source of scenarios for the TAA modeling. The MSFD provides the scenarios, a broad set of challenges and military options, projected threat across a wide spectrum and an approximation of the Army capabilities and contribution to the joint forces. DAMO-SSW produces war plans and war gaming from the OSD generated scenarios/vignettes, all related to the updated QDR strategy.

2) **Internal Army Guidance.**

- a) **The Army Plan (TAP)**, the principal Army guidance for development of the Army program objective memorandum (POM) submission, articulates the SA and CSA translation of the JCS/DOD guidance to all Services into specific direction to the ARSTAF and commands for the development of the Army POM, and the initiation of the TAA process.
- b) The TAP, a HQDA, DCS, G-3/5/7 document, establishes the specific types, sizes, composition and quantities of the “operating forces”.
- c) The TAP provides the force and resource guidance. This constitutes the start point for force structuring activities for HQDA, DCS, G-3/5 DAMO-SSW (War Plans) and G-3/7 DAMO-FMF (Force Management).
- d) DAMO-SSW and DAMO-FMF of the DCS, G-3/5/7 and the **Center for Army Analysis (CAA)**, a Field Operating Agency of the DCS, G-8, use the GDF/JPG and OSD provided scenarios to prepare the combat force apportionment that drives the operating and generating force requirements for that POM cycle. The combat force apportionment dictates the maneuver force needed for the various combat operations and is vetted with the combatant commanders prior to receiving the HQDA DCS, G-3/5/7 approval.
- e) **Leadership Guidance:**
 - (a) CSA directed the ARSTAF to develop a balanced force within the approved end strength.

- (b) The VCSA approved the integrated security posture (ISP) including Steady State Security Posture, Surge Events and Homeland Defense (HD) Consequence Management.

f) Examples of the variety of sources of inputs and guidance are listed here:

OSD and above

National Security Strategy (NSS)
National Military Strategy (NMS)
Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF)
Joint Programming Guidance (JPG)
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
scenarios
Homeland Security Reqt's
Combatant Command Reqt's
Budget Decisions
Total Strength by Component
Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA)
Procurement Decisions
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Treaties

ARMY

The Army Plan (TAP)
Transformation
Army Campaign Plan
Modular designs
AC/RC Force Mix
Posture of Engagements (POE)
Rotational Policy
Stationing Studies

3) Data inputs and force requirement tasks.

1) **Homeland Defense (HLD).** NORTHCOM / PACOM establish Army force structure requirements for HLD and Army Support to Civil Authorities (ASCA). NORTHCOM / PACOM provide plans and assessments for force structure requirements to meet HLD missions, threats and areas of responsibility. Taskings generate future force structure requirements. These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.

2) Mission Task Organized Force (MTOF).

- (a) The NMS assigns future missions to the Services, which generate future requirements. These missions and requirements, drive the development of MTOFs, a ready structured force(s) possessing balanced capabilities adaptable for missions against one or more multi-faceted threat(s). MTOFs are linked to the National Military Strategy (NMS). These MTOF requirements are developed using a "strategy-to-task" process. The tasks in this process are, for the most part, based on the universal joint task list (UJTL). Other MTOFs are generated from specific combatant commander requirements, working groups, workshops and other relevant documents. DCS, G-3/5 War Plans (DAMO-SSW) has staff responsibility for MTOF development and recording.
- (b) Future force structure requirements will be generated through a strategy influenced by QDR 2010.

- (c) These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.
- 3) **Army Support to Other Services (ASOS).** ASOS force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements. Force structure requirements are generated from:
 - (a) approximately 113 DOD directives (i.e., Army is responsible for all Veterinary Services, locomotive services, mail delivery services, etc);
 - (b) requirements generated from Combatant Commander's Operational Plans (OPLANs);
 - (c) Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA); and
 - (d) other operational requirements (i.e., Combatant Commander's Daily Operational Requirements - **CCDOR**).
- 4) **Deter -Postures of Engagement (POE).** Postures of engagement include force deployments such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). They include all of the rotational force structure currently deployed and projected. These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.
- 5) Parameters, planning and consumption factors, and assumptions.
 - (a) HQDA, DCS, G-4, TRADOC, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Army Service Component Command (**ASCC**) and other elements of the HQDA staff (G-1, G-3/5/7 and G-8), provide specific guidance, accurate and detailed consumption factors, planning factors, doctrinal requirements, unit rules of allocation, weapons and munitions data, and deployment assumptions. The parameters, factors and assumptions are needed to conduct the series of modeling and simulation iterations to develop and define the total logistical support requirements necessary to sustain the combat force(s) in each HLD, ASOS, Deter -POE, MTOF or MCO.
 - (b) The parameters, factors and assumptions contain theater-specific information concerning logistics and personnel planning, consumption and workload factors, host-nation support offsets and other planning factors crucial to theater force development. A critical step in the Force Guidance development is the update and revision of the planning and consumption factors, and assumptions.
- 6) **Rules of Allocation (ROA).**
 - (a) Another critical step during the force guidance development is the review and updating of support force unit allocation rules used by the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA), during the modeling process (quantitative analysis).
 - (b) TRADOC and the functional area proponents develop the ROAs for HQDA, DCS, G-3/5/7 approval.
 - (c) The ROA represent a quantitative statement of each type of CBT/CS/CSS unit's capability, mission, and doctrinal employment.

- (d) The ROA are machine-readable; normally an arithmetic statement that incorporates the appropriate planning factors.

AR 71-11, Total Army Analysis, 29 December 1995:

“An allocation rule is a machine readable statement of a unit’s capability, mission and/or doctrinal employment. Normally, it is an arithmetic statement that incorporates the appropriate planning factors. There are three types of allocation rules:”

- Manual***
- Existence***
- Workload***

- (e) There are three basic types of ROA or Allocation Rules:
- (1) Direct input (***manual***) rules are stand-alone requirements for a unit in a theater. The requirement maybe designated as an operating force structure (combat, combat support, combat service support) or generating force. The Area Support Groups in Europe are an example. These organizations are not doctrinally required in the warfight. They are required to support the warfight and the military community. Area Support Groups require people, equipment, facilities and money.
 - (2) ***Existence*** rules tie a requirement from one unit to another. Allocation of units based on the existence of other units, or a function of a theater’s physical or organizational structure. An example, is the force required to operate one large general purpose port, which is 1ea Harborcraft Company. The existence of the Harborcraft Company requires 1ea Military Police Company in support.
 - (3) ***Workload*** rules tie unit requirements to a measurable logistical workload or administrative services in proportion to the volume of those services. Each unit’s allocation is affected by a set of data items (i.e., 1ea DS Maintenance Company per 375 daily man-hours of automotive maintenance or 1ea POL Supply Company per 2200 tons of bulk POL consumed per day).
- (f) The ROA are adjusted as necessary to incorporate new/modified unit TOEs, changes in scenarios, modification of assumptions, adjustment to logistical support plans, additions / deletions / modifications in doctrinal employment concepts, and changes to theater-specific planning factors. **Figure 7** is an example of an allocation rule recommending change.
- (g) Council of Colonels and General Officer Level Reviews, attended by Army Staff (ARSTAF), support agencies, Army Commands, ASCC, DRU and proponent representatives, ensure all ROA are appropriate and approved for use in the current scenarios (see example of ROA – figure 7). TRADOC Force Design Directorate (FDD), posted all Rules of Allocation on AKO (www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp). Figure 6 represents one of several

pages providing data, information, design, etc. The current format enables action officers to clearly understand the allocation rule and advise his/her leadership on approval/disapproval of recommendation(s).

RULE	TYPE	MSFREQ	ARMY BAND (SMALL)							STRENGTH		
X CHANGE NEW 1K DRIVER NO CHANGE	EXISTENCE WORKLOAD C2 WORKLOAD X MANUAL	COMPO 1*	02110L000/400 (OF)							OFF	0	
		COMPO 2								WO	1	
		COMPO 3	02110L100 (GF)							EN	39	
		COMPO 4	02110L200 (Arctic)									
		OTHER	02110L300 (RC)									
		TOTAL	98								TOTAL	40
		TAA13	HLD	DETER	MCO	SR	TRANS	GF	TOTAL			
		REQ	2	5	11	3	0	77	98			

Mission: TO PROVIDE MUSIC THROUGHOUT THE FULL SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND INSTILL IN OUR SOLDIERS THE WILL TO FIGHT AND WIN, FOSTER THE SUPPORT OF OUR CITIZENS, AND PROMOTE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

Capabilities: MUSICAL SUPPORT BY FIELDING UIC-UNIQUE MUSIC SUPPORT TEAMS ORGANIZED AS A CEREMONIAL MUSIC ENSEMBLE, POPULAR MUSIC ENSEMBLES, A BRASS CHAMBER MUSIC ENSEMBLE ORGANIZED FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS, AND INDIVIDUAL MUSICIANS FOR SOLO PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. PROVIDE MUSICAL SUPPORT FOR STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN TACTICAL ENVIRONMENTS. ASSIST IN THE COORDINATED DEFENSE OF THE UNIT'S AREA OR INSTALLATION WHEN REQUIRED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

Assignment (Echelon): (000/200/400) TO SELECTED DIV HQ, ASCC HQ, AND MAJOR ARMY INSTALLATIONS. (100/300) TO SELECTED TRAINING CENTERS, TRAINING DIVISIONS, MAJOR ARMY INSTALLATIONS, REGIONAL RESERVE COMMANDS, AND STATES/TERRITORIES.

Section I TOE BOA: (000/200/400) ONE PER SELECTED DIV HQ, ASCC HQ, OR MAJOR ARMY INSTALLATION. (100/300) ONE PER SELECTED TRAINING CENTER, TRAINING DIVISION, MAJOR ARMY INSTALLATION, REGIONAL RESERVE COMMAND, AND STATE/TERRITORY.

EN: Enlisted
GF: Generating Force
HLD: Homeland Defense
MCO: Major Combat Operations
OF: Operating Force
OFF: Officer
RC: Reserve Component
SR: Strategic Reserve
Trans: Transformation
WO: Warrant Officer

NAME CHANGED FROM DIV/ARMY BAND

PREDECISIONAL

THIS MATCHES WITH
12113L000
IN SAMAS

Figure 7. Example of a Change in a Rule of Allocation

4) **Review and Approval Forums.** This paragraph provides a general overview of the forums.

1) **Council of Colonels / General Officer Forums.** There are two levels of reviews: Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer (GO) forums, which includes Senior Executive Service (SES) participants.

- The CoC / GO forums focus on two types of forums: "REVIEWS" (in Phase I) approve inputs to the TAA process and outputs from the modeling; and "CONFERENCES" (Phase II) determining the resourcing levels for the requirements determined in Phase I.
- The forums are evolving in duration, time, composition and medium. The TAA process has adapted the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) VTC (Video Tele-Conferencing) format to replace the large gatherings in the Military District of Washington (MDW). In preparation for the VTCs, Organizational Integrators (OIs), force Integrators (FIs), Synchronization Staff Officers (SSOs) and Action Officers (AOs), conduct extensive e-mail staffing of issue development, issue

resolution, recommendations for leadership consideration and briefings. This is one of the significant changes implemented as the TAA process evolves.

- (c) CoC/GO Level Reviews are decision forums where all the parameters, constraints, data inputs and guidance are identified and approved for inclusion in the current TAA cycle and CAA models; ***AND*** where the forums review and approve the total force requirements (HLD, ASOS, Deter-POE, MTOF and Analytic Agenda force structure requirements). This is where ***“RISK”*** is addressed. The TAA process is evolving and the review forums are in transition. Each of these forums “meet” several times during the TAA process. The forums meet:

- (1) during phase I to approve data input, guidance, scenarios, and ROA appropriate for inclusion in the TAA process.
- (2) at the end of phase I to review and approve the warfighting force structure requirements developed through the CAA modeling. It focuses on reviewing and approving the “required force” file prior to the VCSA reviewing and approving the “required force”. The required force is prioritized in accordance with the guidance provided in the QDR, GDF/JPG and TAP. The prioritization was previously referred to as the ***“Simultaneity Stack”***.
- (3) during phase II to resolve resourcing issues.
 - (1) The resourcing conference CoC provides the opportunity for the ARSTAF, commands, proponent representatives and staff support agencies to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues.
 - (2) The resourcing conference CoC provides the initial qualitative analysis and review of the CAA developed force.
 - (3) The qualitative phase culminates with the resourcing conference GO forums named General Officer Steering Committees (GOSC). The GO Level forum reviews and approves the decisions of the resourcing conference CoC and addresses remaining unresolved issues.
 - (4) The Resourcing GOSC now includes a ***“TWO STAR”***, ***“THREE STAR”*** and ***“FOUR STAR”*** level review.
 - (5) The resourcing conference GO level reviews approve the force that is distributed by the G-37 (FM) for the Army-wide force feasibility review (FFR). The results of the FFRs are forwarded as options to the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army for review and decision.

- 2) **The Force Program Review (FPR)** is the process where the leadership reviews and approves the POM force for inclusion in the Army’s POM submission. The forum is the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army, consisting of the SA, USA, CSA and VCSA. The recommended force structure options are briefed through the Director, Force Management, to the G-3/5/7 and to the Senior Leaders. At the conclusion of the brief, the CSA decides the force structure recommended for

inclusion in the Army's submission to OSD. ***This is one of the significant changes to the TAA process during the last three years. This modification reduced the FPR timeline significantly.***

- 3) ARSTAF, Army Commands, AMC, TRADOC schools, Army Service Component Commands, and field operating agencies (FOAs), participate in the CoC forums. The CoC level review ensures all data input and guidance is appropriate and approved for use in the current scenario(s).
- 4) The Senior Leadership of the Department of the Army (SLDA) participates in the GO level forums. The GO level review addresses those issues that were unresolved at the CoC forum and approves all assumptions, planning factors, allocation rules and guidance as inputs for the second part of Phase I, the CAA modeling.
- 5) CoC /GO Level Reviews recommend adjustments and approve inputs and parameters for the modeling conducted by CAA. These forums are scheduled to approve the specific data inputs to the CAA computer models and review the warfighting force structure requirements (outputs) developed through CAA computer modeling. Inputs include the combat modeling, approving the priority of flow, requirements versus capabilities, and the campaign plan (warfight and support concept). The format and content of the reviews are subject to change. However, the forums should approve the related items in these general categories:
 - (a) **Deployment models.** This category focuses on how we deploy. Inputs include Air Force and Navy assets available for movement of equipment and personnel. This category focuses on how we model and constrain the force. Inputs include: the general parameters; modeling for all U.S., allied, and threat forces; deployment assumptions; and all weapons, characteristics, rates of fire, munitions availability, and lethality.
 - (b) **Combat modeling.** This category focuses on how we fight the force. Currently, the Joint Integrated Combat Model (JICM), is used to determine the intensities, distances traveled, battle casualties, non-battle casualties, major end items replaced, repair parts used and classes of supplies expended (in tons).
 - (c) **Force Generator (FORGE).** This category focuses on how we support and sustain the force (**figure 8**). This forum terminates the guidance determination when all assumptions, planning factors and guidance inputs are approved for the current TAA cycle. Inputs considered for approval are fuel, ammunition, host nation support (HNS), coalition support, stockage levels, casualty rates, evacuation policy and rules of allocation.
 - (d) CoC/GO Level Reviews are currently working within the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) video tele-conferencing forum format.

generating force structure required to support the “operating force” comprised of BCTs and EAB (CS/CSS) units.

- a. **CAA modeling.** CAA accomplishes the modeling of TAA through a series of analytical efforts and associated computer simulations. Improved modeling, accurate consumption factors, proper allocation rules, and application of the rules develop the most accurate definition of the total force requirements to support the directed MCOs, HLD, Deter-POE, ASOS and the Analytic Agenda. There are approximately 33 models used by CAA to determine total requirements. The sequence is shown at **Figure 9**.




Figure 9. Quantitative Analysis

- 1) **GDAS-** Global Deployment Analysis System. A strategic deployment analysis, GDAS, is accomplished for each scenario. CAA models have as their major inputs the available strategic mobility (lift) forces, the joint force(s) requiring movement, the required mobilization and training times for RC forces, and the capability desired to deliver the “operating force” in the theater of operations. The major output is the achievable movement of units to the mobilization station, through the port-of-embarkation, to the port-of-debarkation, and finally to the tactical assembly area achieving the employment schedule for all units (CBT/CS/CSS). This becomes one input into the theater combat operations analysis, (JICM).

- 2) **JICM**- Joint Integrated Combat Model. A theater combat operations analysis is accomplished at both tactical and operational levels for each scenario, using the additional major inputs of friendly and enemy weapons' quantities and effectiveness data, friendly and enemy tactical and operational doctrines, projected resupply capabilities, and available joint and combined forces. Major outputs, which become inputs to the theater logistical analyses, Force Generator (FORGE), include forward line of troops (FLOT) movement over time, personnel casualties and equipment damage or loss to the "operating force", ammunition expenditures, and brigade combat intensities.
 - 3) **FORGE**- Force Generator. A theater logistical analysis for each scenario utilizes the outputs of JICM as inputs, along with such logistical data as in-place stocks, existing infrastructure and the transportation network, available host-nation support, projected consumption rates, field level and depot level maintenance requirement factors, and supply, medical, and construction policies to determine time-phased personnel replacement, medical, material, maintenance, construction, and transportation workloads. In combination with the allocation rules approved by the review forums, these workloads generate the CS/CSS support force requirements and a time-phased required troop deployment list for that scenario.
- b. **Total Force requirements.** The total force requirements include the force requirements identified to successfully conduct Homeland Security/Homeland Defense (**HLS/HLD**), Army support to other services (**ASOS**), Deter-Posture of Engagements (**POE**), Combatant Commander's daily operational requirements (**CCDOR**), and the warfights modeled by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). The warfighting models are based on illustrative planning scenarios generated by OSD within the Analytic Agenda process. Guidance (GDF, JPG or QDR) provides the directed force (number of BCTs), the threat, coalition forces, the area of operations and the strategy. The TAA process generates the force structure required to support the combat force (BCTs). Support force includes combat support (**CS**), combat service support (**CSS**) and the generating force (**GF**) required to support the major combat operations (MCO), HLD, POE, ASOS and CCDOR. The total force requirements include changes to the force, over time, for modernization. Modernization is projected through the use of Intermediate Tables of Organizations and Equipment (ITOE).
- 1) The total MTOE/ITOE and TDA requirements file include units required/generated for Homeland Security. NORTHCOM and USARPAC provide guidance, threat, force structure requirements and mission directives.
 - 2) Army Support to Other Services (**ASOS**) force structure requirements are generated from DOD directives, where the Army is the executive agent for approximately 113 tasks; combatant command's operational plans (**OPLANs**); combatant command's daily operational requirements (**CCDOR**); and inter-service support agreements (**ISSA**).
 - 3) Deter-Posture of Engagement (**POE**) force structure requirements are determined from the tasks included in the GDF/JPG. The mission tasked organized force (MTOF), provide approximately 125 different scenarios and required force structure

to accomplish the tasks. Examples of Deter-POE: peacekeeping, peace enforcement such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and nation building efforts. Examples of “what if drills”: hurricanes, floods and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

- 4) Two directed Major Combat Operations (MCO). The MCO(s) produce a "Time-Phased" force that includes the “operating” forces and "doctrinal" echelon above Brigade Combat Team force structure requirements (fully structured and totally optimized – meaning ALO 1), that sustain the combat forces based on the GDF/JPG and scenarios, doctrine, allocation rules and the conduct of the warfight. DOD provides the defense planning scenarios through the Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD). The MSFD provides the scenarios, a broad set of challenges and military options, projected threat across a wide spectrum and an approximation of the Army capabilities and contribution to the joint forces.

c. **The force sizing construct.**

- 1) The required force is prioritized in accordance with the guidance provided in the QDR, GDF/JPG and TAP. The prioritization is referred to as the force sizing construct. The prioritization was formerly known as “the **Simultaneity Stack**”.
- 2) Starting in February 2006, the force sizing construct was directed from QDR 2006 (figure 10).




Figure 10. FMR Force Sizing Construct

- 3) The force sizing construct continues to mature through the efforts of OSD and the development of the Operational Availability (OA) Studies. TAA 10-15 force sizing guidance is based on Persistent Conflict Demands and the Rotational Requirements of ARFORGEN (**figure 11**).




Figure 11. Persistent Conflict Force Sizing Construct

- 4) DCS, G-3/7 will use the Persistent Conflict and Rotational Requirements of ARFORGEN for the force sizing construct during TAA 12-17.
- 5) DCS, G-3/7 will investigate the influence and impacts of QDR 2009/2010 on force structure during TAA 12-17.
- 2) **Review and approval.** Phase I (Requirements Determination), is complete after the COC/GO level forums review the CAA computer generated output (total warfighting MTOE/ITOE and TDA requirements).
 - 1) The total warfighting requirements, portrayed by FORGE, are a fully structured and resourced force at authorized level of organization (**ALO**) 1.
 - 2) Additionally, the COC/GO Level Review approves the force structure requirements supporting Homeland Security/Homeland Defense, Deter-POE, all of the approved MTOFs, units conducting transformation, and the Generating Force. The GO Level Review recommends approval of the force to the VCSA.
 - 3) The VCSA reviews and approves the "total force requirements" generated through the computer models, which provide the doctrinally required units from CAA (provided by FORGE), and recognized within the force sizing construct. The VCSA's review and approval is the transition to Phase II of TAA (Resource Determination).
 - 4) **MATCH MODEL.** After the VCSA reviews and approves the total force requirements, a comparison of data files (MATCH report), is made between the VCSA approved total force requirements (CAA developed) and the current program force [Master Force (**MFORCE**)], from the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (**SAMAS**). SAMAS contains the planned, programmed and budgeted subsets for each approved organization over the POM years.
 - (a) The MATCH (not an acronym) report provides the "delta" between the new CAA modeling developed requirements and the programmed force (SAMAS file). The MATCH is accomplished through a computer comparison program (**Figure 11**). CAA produces the "required MTOE and TDA" force file by

Resource Allocation Model (RAM)

Army Flow Model "MATCH" Process

The AE2S "MATCH" is the process that aligns resources (units) to the requirements in the Simultaneity Stack

The diagram illustrates the Resource Allocation Model (RAM) process flow. It starts with 'Build Req. stack & units file' and 'Units file COMPO 1, 2, 3 MTOE units Deployed-G3-FM'. These feed into 'Auto Match in RAM'. The 'Auto Match in RAM' process involves 'Requirements' and 'Units' and is labeled 'MACHINE MATCH'. The output of 'Auto Match in RAM' is 'Manual Match Decrease unfilled req. & unused units'. This process also involves 'Requirements' and 'Units' and is labeled 'Manual match'. The output of 'Manual Match' is 'Unfilled Requirements' and 'Unused units'. These feed into 'MATCH FILE' and 'AUTO ARSTRUC'. The 'MATCH FILE' and 'AUTO ARSTRUC' feed into 'Unfilled Requirements' and 'Unused units'.

Resource Allocation Model

The Resource Allocation Model (RAM) matches available units (UIC) to requirements (SRC 9) of the TAA Simultaneity Stack.

Build Req. stack & units file

Auto Match in RAM

Manual Match Decrease unfilled req. & unused units

Unfilled Requirements

MATCH FILE

Unused units

AUTO ARSTRUC

Units file COMPO 1, 2, 3 MTOE units Deployed-G3-FM

User sets criteria for auto match

Manual match

AE2S: Army Equipping Enterprise System

FS 14- 23

FMC TAA 49

Figure 13 demonstrates the relationship of the MATCH model between the CAA force file and the SAMAS database; the methodology and the resolution of the issues.

A computer program compares the VCSA approved, doctrinally required, force file provided from CAA with a current list of on-hand and programmed units (MFORCE from SAMAS), to determine the “delta” for future programming discussions and issue formulation. The MATCH report and required force files are provided to DCS, G-3/7 (FM) for dissemination to the commands for review and issue formulation in preparation for the Resource Determination phase.

The MATCH compares Standard Requirement Code (SRC), Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), component (COMPO) and location. If the CAA developed and VCSA approved requirement is greater than the programmed

quantity, that SRC is a “**claimant**”. If the approved requirement is less than the programmed quantity, that SRC is a potential “**billpayer**”.




Figure 13. MATCH Model Relationship

2. TAA Phase II. Resource Determination.

Resource Determination consists of two separate activities: Qualitative Analysis and Leadership Review. The qualitative analysis is the most emotional facet of the TAA process because the results impact every aspect of the Army. Therefore, this phase requires extensive preparation by participants to ensure the best warfighting force structure is developed.

- Qualitative analysis.** Qualitative analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within total strength guidance, for use in the development of the POM. A series of resourcing forums, analyses, panel reviews, and conferences consider and validate the FORGE model generated requirements and the analysis of those requirements. The qualitative analysis is conducted during the resourcing conference. The resourcing conference is conducted in two separate sessions: Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). In September of 2003, the Army leadership directed the Director, Force Management (G-3/7) to modify the TAA process in order to develop options versus a single force structure solution. The resourcing conferences provided the

forum to develop the flexibility the CSA desired. The evaluation of the options were conducted through the Force Feasibility Review forum. The Director, Force Management, directed multiple Force Feasibility Reviews (FFR) be conducted to evaluate each of the force structure options developed and recommended for review by the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (formerly named the Executive Office of the Headquarters or EOH).

a. **Resourcing Conference CoC.**

- 1) The resourcing conference CoC provides the initial qualitative analysis and review of the CAA product by ARSTAF, proponents, commands and staff support agency representatives, to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues. *The issues focus on component (COMPO) and center on resolving claimant versus billpayer resourcing issues, while voicing concerns about priorities versus risks.* The AC/RC mix and end-strength concerns are key recommendation outputs of this conference. This forum allows combatant commander representatives (Army Service Component Commanders), to verify that theater specific requirements are satisfied by Army force structure assigned/apportioned to their commands to meet current combatant commander operation plan (OPLAN)/concept plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements and theater day-to-day requirements (CCDOR).
- 2) HQDA action officers and their counterparts enter an intense round of preparations for the upcoming resourcing conference. Since the quantitative analysis only determined requirements for doctrinally correct, fully resourced (ALO 1) CBT/CS/CSS units deployed into the theater(s) of operations, the determination of a need for additional non-deploying units, the acceptance of risk through the reduction in ALO of units, and the allocation of resourced units to components (Active Army, ARNG, or USAR), must be accomplished during the resourcing conferences.
- 3) *This is the first point at which the COMPO becomes a factor.* Currently, several AC/RC force structure issues are being conducted: AC/RC rebalance directed by the Secretary of Defense, AC/RC Force Structure Mix, support for modular units (BCT), Homeland Security force structure requirements, growth in the components and state mission requirements in the ARNG are the major issues.
- 4) HQDA bases force structuring options on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, the threat and the constraints. The primary differences among various options are the extent to which risk, constraints and time are forecast.
- 5) The resourcing conference forums are transitioning. The format, length of time, issue development and presentation are under review. Successes in MSFA 07-11, TAA 08-13 and MFR 09-13, will solidify the timing, location, and focus of each resourcing conference meeting.
- 6) The focus of the resourcing conference is to identify and develop potential solutions for the myriad of issues brought to TAA. The OIs and force integrators (FIs) are key individuals in this forum. The OIs and FIs have the responsibility to pull together the sometimes diverse guidance and opinions developed during the

conference, add insight from a branch perspective, and establish whether the changes in the building blocks for the design case were in fact the best course of action. The OIs pull all the relevant information together for presentation to the CoC. During these presentations, the OI reviews each standard requirements code (SRC) that falls under his/her area of responsibility, and presents recommendations on how to solve the various issues. The FI has the responsibility to provide a macro view of issues across the functional branches. Other major players are staff officers in the G-8, G-1, G-4 and PA&E.

- 7) The resourcing conference CoC integrates TDA / MTOE issues. The CoC reviews the issues and requirements, resolving issues based upon sound military judgment and experience.

b. Force Feasibility Review (FFR).

- 1) By regulation, the CoC submits their product to the Force Feasibility Review (FFR) process for review by the ARSTAF. By regulation, the CoC forwards their recommendations and unresolved issues, after the FFR process is completed, to the resourcing conference GOSC. In 2003, the CSA directed the Director, Force Management (G-3/7), to modify the TAA process in order to develop options instead of a single force structure recommendation. The resourcing conferences provided the forum to develop the flexibility the CSA desired. The Director, Force Management, used the FFR format and forum to develop and evaluate options. Based on this change, the FFR has moved, in the sequence, from between the CoC Resourcing Conference and the GOSC, to after the GOSC Resourcing Conference. The change in sequence insures that the recommendations forwarded by the GOSC to the two, three and four star reviews are affordable, supportable, and executable.
- 2) The ARSTAF conducts a series of modified FFRs during the resource determination phase. The ARSTAF further analyzes the force, initially approved by the CoC and the GOSC, via the FFR. The FFR process uses the results of the TAA resourcing conference as input, conducting a review and proposing adjustments to the options prior to presenting the options to the Senior Leaders.
- 3) The FFRs answer the questions (**Figure 14**) to ensure the options are affordable and supportable. At the MACRO level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FFR determines if the option can be manned, trained, equipped, sustained and stationed. The FFR process identifies problems with any option and provides alternatives, based on prior TAA initiatives, previous decisions from the Army leadership, or program budget decisions (PBD), to the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army forum for determining the most capable force within constraints.

FFR Focus Areas


- The Force Feasibility Review provides a rapid HQDA review and assessment of executability, supportability, and affordability of the force by answering such questions as:
 - Can We *Equip*?
 - Can We *Man*?
 - Can We *Train*?
 - Can We *Sustain*?
 - Can We *Provide Facilities*?
 - Can We *Afford*?

Figure 14. Force Feasibility Review

- c. **Resourcing Conference GOSC.** The qualitative phase culminates with the resourcing conference: General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). The GOSC reviews/approves the decisions of the resourcing conference COC, reviews the output from the FFR process and addresses remaining unresolved issues. The DCS, G-3/7 is using the Army Campaign Plan VTC forum to bring the recommendations to the GOSC. Additionally, the GOSC forum has been expanded from a single GOSC chaired by the DCS, G-3/5/7 into two star, three star and four star forums, in sequence. The resourcing conference GOSC approves the force that is forwarded to the Senior Leaders forum for review and ultimately the CSA's decision and Secretary of the Army's approval.
- b. **Leadership review.** The leadership review is initiated through the force program review (FPR) process. The FPR is the process where the leadership reviews and approves the POM force for inclusion in the Army's POM submission. The forum is the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army, consisting of the SA, USA, CSA and VCSA. The Senior Leaders forum resolves any issues forwarded from the resourcing conference forums. The recommended force structure options are briefed by the Director, Force

Management, G-3/7, to the Senior Leaders forum. The Senior Leaders forum analyzes, reviews and evaluates the options. At the conclusion of the presentations to this forum, the CSA decides the force structure recommended for inclusion in the Army's POM submission to OSD. ***This is the second most significant change in the TAA process during the last five years. This modification reduced the FPR timeline significantly.***

- c. Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC). The ARSTRUC memorandum provides a historical record of the Army's Senior Leadership final decisions made during the TAA process. The ARSTRUC memorandum, produced by DCS, G-3/7 (FM), is directive in nature, providing the commands results at the standard requirements code (SRC) level of detail. The ARSTRUC memorandum marks the end of the TAA process. **Figure 15** reflects processes and products used after the completion of the TAA process. The ARSTRUC memorandum directs the commands to make appropriate adjustments to their force structure at the unit identification code (UIC) level of detail during the next command plan. Command Plan (CPLAN) changes are recorded in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), the official database of record for the Army force structure. SAMAS, along with the basis of issue plans (BOIP) and table of organization and equipment (TOE), provides the basis for Army authorization documentations (MTOE and TDA).



Actions Subsequent to TAA

- Publish the ARSTRUC Memorandum
- Update the Army M-Force (SAMAS)
- SACS (Structure and Composition System)
- AAO (Army Acquisition Objective)
- AE2S (Equipment Distribution)
- PMAD (Personnel Management Authorization Document)

ARTRUC: Army Structure Memorandum
AE2S: Army Enterprise System
SAMAS: Structure and Manpower Allocation System
TAA: Total Army Analysis

FMC TAA 13

3/7/2009

Figure 15. Actions Post TAA

VII. The product of TAA

The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved and funded force structure for America's Army.

1. The resourced TAA force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, host nation) and Type Unit Code (TYPCO: MTOE, Augmentation TDA or TDA) requirements through the end of the POM years (MFORCE). The POM force meets the projected mission requirements within anticipated end strength and equipment levels. The final output should result in an executable POM Force. The Army forwards the POM force to OSD with a recommendation for approval.
2. The product of the TAA and POM is the approved force structure for the Army, which has been divided for resource management purposes into components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO 2), and the USAR (COMPO 3). Three other components — direct host-nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host-nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9) — comprise force structure offsets. COMPO 7 and 8 are guaranteed by host-nation support agreements. COMPO 9 is an augmentation, not an offset and represents contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms augmenting existing force structure. COMPO 4 represented the unresourced units in SAMAS. COMPO 4 units, mostly CSS units, are a part of the Army's required force structure, but were deliberately not resourced so that available resources could be applied to higher priority peacetime force structure initiatives and other Army programs.
3. Another method of apportioning the limited resources against the larger force structure requirements is through the reduction in Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) of specified units (deployment at a later date), thereby accepting some risk for having a diminished capability in the programmed force.

Appendix A: Some TAA Historical Information (TAA 07 through TAA 12-17).

1. General. This is a historical perspective of the sequential TAA efforts since 1999:

- a. DOD and Army transformation resulted in the need for a more responsive TAA process. Transformation, Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), BRAC, QDR, modular force design, ARFORGEN and persistent conflict necessitated changes in the TAA and all related processes.
- b. GEN Shinseki introduced the IBCT in the fall of 1999. GEN Schoomaker introduced the Modular Force Design in the fall of 2003. To meet the expected timelines, changes in force structure and impacts from the QDR, the CSA directed the process to:
 - a. Become more agile, timely and flexible.
 - b. Develop options instead of a single solution for the POM force.
 - c. Leverage technology.
- c. Changes in force structure resulting from Operational needs, surge in capabilities, expedite the fielding of units, increases in total strength for all components, changes in the directed force composition from OSD and Army leadership decisions. These changes bring about force structure and modernization changes, impacting the TAA formats, forums, time sequence and suspense dates.
 - a. Senior Advisor Groups (SAGs) were initiated to review and approve inputs (data, guidance, rules, etc.) and outputs (total requirements, resourcing and risk analysis) in FY 2000.
 - b. Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH), was used to decrease the briefing time to the senior leaders of the Army (FY 2004).
 - c. CSA (GEN Schoomaker) directed the ARSTAF develop several options within the TAA process. The CSA was aware that modularity and the QDR could cause significant changes to the force structure and POM submission. Also, the CSA understood that the QDR would be published after TAA 08-13 was completed by the Army. The CSA desired flexibility of reviewing several options in December 2005 in preparation for the distribution of the QDR (and potential impacts of change), scheduled for February 2006, where he would select the appropriate course of action. The options were developed and presented through the existing Force Feasibility Review (FFR) forum and sub-process.
 - d. General Officer Steering Committees are augmented with two, three and four star reviews in FY 2008.
- d. The TAA process has matured to a consistent 10 month process versus the Army Regulation time of 2 years.
- e. TAAs were renamed to include the full POM years. Example: TAA 11 became TAA 06-11.

2. TAA process is evolving. Since October 1999, the TAA process has experienced significant evolutionary change. The format of the process, leadership guidance, strategic guidance, Lean Six Sigma reviews, computer capabilities, timing and other tangential process reviews have impacted the process and products.

- a. TAA-07 / TAA07.1. Provided the force structure for POM 02-07.
 - 1) In October 1999, GEN Shinseki (CSA) directed a major change in force structure. The organizational change ushered in the “interim brigade combat team” - IBCT.
 - 2) TAA 07 was almost complete when the CSA announce his decision to initiate the IBCT force design change. The IBCT initiative required an adjustment to the Army's POM recommendation to OSD. The POM adjustment reflected the change in CS/CSS to support two IBCTs versus a heavy and light divisional brigade.
 - 3) GEN Shinseki directed the creation of two (2) IBCTs. TRADOC conducted a Force Design Update (FDU) on the design. USAFMSA simultaneously developed a TOE and MTOE for the IBCTs.
 - 4) The CSA announced the effective dates (EDATES) for the conversion of the two IBCTs as September 2000 and September 2001.
 - 5) The change converted one heavy divisional brigade and one light infantry brigade to the IBCT design.
 - 6) The CSA understood that this conversion impacted the “logistical footprint” of the former heavy and light infantry brigades. To ensure proper CS / CSS support, TAA 07.1, an excursion, was executed between Oct '99 and Apr '00 capturing the delta in support between the heavy/light force structure and the IBCT design.
 - 7) The POM build for FY02-07 included the TAA07.1 results. Additionally, the CSA directed mid-year adjustments to the FY '00 execution year, and appropriate changes to the budget submission for FY '01 and '02.
 - 8) Additional key events for TAA 07/07.1:
 - (a) Addressed Post Hostilities.
 - (b) Included FORCE XXI design enhancements.
 - (c) Included Mission Task Organized Force (MTOF) requirements to address the excursions and “what if drills”. CAA developed 125 MTOF scenarios to address peacekeeping, peace enforcement, fires, floods, hurricanes, Non-combatant Evacuation operations, etc.
- b. TAA-09. Completed in February 2002. Provided the POM force for POM 04-09.
 - 1) Based on the “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct.
 - 2) Included: the Army Division Re-design effort and the ARNG redesign efforts named The Army Guard Re-engineering Initiative (AGRI).
 - 3) Included a temporary plus up of 30K in AC total strength.
 - 4) The directed force was 77 combat brigades. This included the 15 ARNG “eSB” - or Enhanced Separate Brigades and the Force XXI design effort.

- 5) Key points:
 - (a) Captured emerging Homeland Security requirements to establish force baseline.
 - (b) Established baseline requirements for the global war on terrorism (GWOT).
 - (c) Two Major Combat Operations (MCOs) included *decisive defeat* (Korea) and *defeat the efforts* (SWA).
 - (d) Captured the Combatant Commander's day-to-day requirements.
 - (e) Implemented the 2 division strategic reserve.
 - (f) Resourced the initial SIX (6) interim brigade combat teams (IBCT) and the TWO (2) higher commands (HICON).
 - (g) Identified the Generating Force requirements.
- c. **TAA 11.** Completed in November 2003. Supported the POM 06-11 submission to OSD.
 - 1) Based on the 1:4:2:1 force sizing construct articulated in QDR 2001 and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 2002.
 - 2) Included modular force design as defined to that point. The complete impact of modularity would be determined in subsequent TAA efforts projected to be completed by June 2004. Documented modularity related structure changes approved to date.
 - 3) Significant changes developed to offset claimants and billpayers were identified to bring uniformed structure back down to 482.4K (FY07+).
 - 4) used current operational command documents for Homeland Security requirements.
 - 5) used input from ASCC to refine day-to-day requirements for combatant commanders.
 - 6) developed robust posture of engagement (POE) for Rotational Base requirements.
 - 7) modeled three Swiftly Defeat the Efforts (SDTE) & two Win Decisively (WD) scenarios, blending the support requirements.
 - 8) updated and expanded the capabilities of the strategic reserve.
 - 9) conducted a more detailed review of the Generating Force requirements.
 - 10) applied new logistics planning factors and allocation rules (Logistics Transformation Task Force).
 - 11) decreased 219K of requirements (shorter campaigns and a closer look at HLS/HLD).
 - 12) Transformation included:
 - (a) Corps Re-design
 - (b) ARNG Division Restructure
 - (c) Logistics Transformation.
 - (d) Army Division Restructure System (ADRS) and Army Guard Re-engineering Initiative (AGRI) modifications
 - 13) Objective Force design and capabilities (Unit of Action)
 - 14) TAA modeled 3 Major combat Operations

- 15) Forward stationing footprint
 - (a) USAREUR force ceiling (not fixed at 62K AC)
 - (b) ARCENT
 - 16) NORTHCOM missions and requirements for HLS.
- d. **Modular Support Force Analysis (MSFA) 07-11:** Completed in December 2004.
- 1) GEN Schoomaker (CSA) introduced the Modular design for the Combat Brigades in the fall of 2003. CSA directed two modular design actions.
 - (a) 3rd Infantry Division directed to reconfigure to 5 BCTs in the modular design, within current assets. 3rd Infantry Division designed 4 BCTs while increasing equipment and personnel requirements.
 - (b) TRADOC initiated a modular design initiative.
 - 2) He also directed changes in the TAA process to meet the current needs, projected speed of change in the force structure and posturing the force for POM 08-13, QDR 2005 and mission changes.
 - (a) CSA directed a more rapid TAA process. MSFA, which took 13 weeks, met the CSA's guidance.
 - (b) CSA requested that the process become more agile, timely and flexible.
 - (c) CSA directed that the process develop options instead of a single solution for the POM force.
 - (d) CSA directed the increased use of technology to meet the time lines and produce the options for courses of action.
 - 3) The focus of MSFA was to capture and analyze the “*delta*” in the required “logistics footprint” as the force structure moved from Force XXI through the Objective Force. The results were included as input to the TAA 08-13 process and set the stage for QDR 2005/2006.
 - 4) Key points:
 - (a) Provided an updated Force File by December 2004 to feed the 07-11 POM update.
 - (b) Incorporated Modularity (to the extent possible).
 - (c) Updated and refined Post Hostility requirements.
 - (d) Incorporated OIF/OEF lessons learned.
 - (e) Postured efforts for transition to TAA 08-13.
 - (f) Supported Army preparation for and participation in QDR 05.
 - (g) Determined the need for an FY06 PBD to support the Army’s transition to Modularity.
 - (h) Provided Modularity Force Summary Options to the CSA.

e. **TAA 08-13** was completed in December 2005, in support of the POM 08-13 submission.

1) Focus:

- (a) Completed the modular force design conversion.
- (b) Incorporated FDU decisions made after MSFA 07-11 began.
- (c) TAA 08-13 did not fully capture all QDR 2006 directives.
- (d) Addressed options, in coordination with the Army Planners, focused on the QDR 2005/2006 results announced in February 2006. QDR 2006 unveiled a new force sizing construct, guidance and constraints. The directed force was reduced to 70 BCTs, while the total strength remained at 1.065 million spaces (all components).

2) Changes in the TAA process:

- (a) Initiated VTC as forum. VTCs replaced the Council of Colonels and General Officer Steering Committee forums conducted in the Washington, DC area.
- (b) Initiated the Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH) format for briefing the Army leadership, to provide information and gain approval by the CSA. This forum has now been renamed to Senior Leaders of the Headquarters of the Army.
- (c) Shortened the TAA process to a 10 month effort.
- (d) Initiated the requirements development phase immediately upon conclusion of the FY04 Modular Support Force Analysis (MSFA).
- (e) Aligned with QDR efforts and incorporated emerging QDR Results.
- (f) Conducted Generating Force analysis offline and provided results as input to the main effort.
- (g) Provided results *early enough* to inform the FY 08-13 POM build.

3) TAA 08-13 Priorities of Effort –

- (a) Incorporated TRADOC Modular Force Review:
 - (1) Refined/Updated BCT(UA)/UEX/Spt Bde impacts.
 - (2) Incorporated emerging UEY/Theater adjustments.
- (b) Built a new SWA scenario.
- (c) Updated and refined Post Hostility requirements/other MTOFs.
- (d) Incorporated AC/RC rebalance initiatives.
 - (1) Rebalance AC BCTs
 - (2) Rebalance ARNG (6 BCTs to EAB CBT / CS / CSS)
 - (3) Incorporated Decision Point (DP)-57 into USAR.
- (e) Began standardization of TDA structure and integration of the TAA Institutional Army into the TAA process.
- (f) Incorporated QDR decisions

- (g) Addressed HomeLand Defense Requirements
 - (h) Addressed TAA 08-13 capability risks & emerging requirements
- 4) Completed Modularity transformation
 - (a) Developed and apply Army Expeditionary Force Packages (AEFP).
 - (b) Incorporated emerging BRAC results.
 - (c) Incorporated Institutional Army Adaptation results.
- f. **Force Mangement Review (FMR) 09-13** was completed in December 2006. The data was used for the POM update 09-13 submission.
 - 1) Captured the Force Design Update (FDU) and force structure decisions not included in TAA 08-13, but needed to be addressed prior to TAA 10-15.
 - 2) FMR 09-13 was planned for a 10 month window from start to finish. The initial timeline scheduled the completion in December 2006. Note: FMR 09-13 was not completed until August 2008. The FMR process was extended to capture the growth in total strength and increase in BCTs approved by the President in January 2007. Grow the Army Plan (GTA Plan) became the product of this guidance.
 - 3) Focused on the update to the POM submission for years 09-13.
- g. **Force Management Review 09-13** was completed in August 2008. DCS, G-3/7 published the POM force for POM 10-15.
 - 1) **FMR 09-13** process was almost completed when the Army leadership was made aware that the President might increase the total strength of the Army.
 - 2) The President of the United States provided additional guidance post QDR 2006 to the Army. The President increased the Army's total strength by approximately 74.2K, with increases within each component. The guidance increased the "directed force" grow from 70 to 76 BCTs. The growth included restoration of one AC BCT and an increase of 5 AC BCTs. The guidance directed all growth to be completed by FY 2013.
 - 3) The Director, Force Management, developed the "Grow the Army Plan" (GTA Plan). .
 - (a) The increase in total strength of 74.2K included: 65K for AC, 8.2K for ARNG and 1K for USAR.
 - (b) The directed force increase to 76 BCTS included an increase in Active Component BCTs from 42 to 48 into the program by FY **2013**.
 - (c) FMR 09-13 was extended in January 2007. The extended process was temporarily renamed **FMR 09-13+**. The process was subsequently titled **FMR 09-13 (GTA)**.
 - (d) FMR 09-13 (GTA) provided the POM force data for the POM 10-15 submission.
 - 4) **FMR 09-13 (GTA)** was completed in August 2008. The ARSTRUC was published 4 October 2008. The process:
 - (a) Integrated the Institutional Army End Strength strategy. Institutional Army TAA Goals:

- (1) Determine the right size and composition of the Institutional Army (I-A) to support GTA plan.
 - (2) Link the I-A into the TAA process.
 - (3) Provide senior leaders the opportunity to prioritize capabilities and capacity.
 - (4) Provide a forum for senior leaders to assess feasibility, risk and trade-offs in structure and dollar resources.
- (b) Incorporated Stability Operations.
- (c) Continued AC/RC rebalance initiatives.
- (d) Rated evolving requirements.
 - (1) Surge and Expedite. The President directed a surge in BCTs deployed to Iraq. Resourcing those BCTs impacted existing modernization and conversion efforts for AC/RC units. Additionally, the Army was directed to expedite the conversion of two BCTs.
 - (2) Accelerate the growth. The President directed the increase of the total strength for the AC to be completed by 2013. The CSA obtained approval to complete the increase NLT the end of **FY 2010**.
 - (3) Incorporate second generation MTOE process to update the POM build.
- (e) The ARSTRUC Memorandum 09-13 (GTA) was distributed on 4 October 2008.
- h. **TAA 10-15:** The execution of TAA 10-15 was delayed while the ARSTAF addressed the significant increase in Total Strength authorized by the President of the United States in January 2007.
 - 1) GEN Casey (CSA) decided to accelerate the completion date to 2010 for personnel increases; and 2011 for equipping. The Army leadership then extended the FMR 09-13 (GTA) process into the summer of 2007 to capture the CSA's guidance. Timing and significant coordination resulted in the use of the results of FMR 09-13 as the basis for the POM Force for POM 10-15 .
 - 2) The Director, Force Management, initiated **TAA 10-15** in January 2007, and re-initiated the process again in August 2007. The CSA decision ended the process in March 2009. An ARSTRUC memorandum addendum is forthcoming. The TAA 10-15 force will inform the Army's input to Program Budget Review (PBR) 2011-15.
 - 3) This TAA sequence did not incorporate the SECDEF guidance for President's Budget (PB10), which was announced on 6 April 2009, but it set the force structure in preparation for QDR 2009/2010 and POM 12-17.
 - 4) TAA 10-15 key objectives:
 - (a) Informed by Operational Availability (OA) 08.
 - (b) Reviewed / updated Rules of Allocation.
 - (c) Addressed BCT mix and support brigade requirements.
 - (d) Incorporated approved FDUs.

- (e) Informed by the ARFORGEN modeling process.
- 5) GEN Casey (CSA) approved the results of TAA 10-15 in early March 2009. TAA 10-15 used the results of the Grow the Army Plan to build 76 BCTs and support brigades within the Army's total strength.

i. **TAA 12-17:**

- 1) Initiated in April 2009.
- 2) Initially addresses remaining TAA10-15 issues. Will address emerging guidance from the President, Congress, OSD, the QDR results, and internal Army guidance and decisions.
- 3) DCS, G-3/7 continues to review and adapt the TAA process to best support Army requirements.
- 4) TAA 12-17 timeline has not been approved.
- 5) TAA 12-17 will produce the POM force for POM 12-17.
- 6) TAA 12-17 sets the force in preparation for TAA 14-19.

APPENDIX B: TAA 12-17 Time Line

To Be Published